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At the present time one of the most important
questions that is brought before the public mind is the
labor question. The duty that the employer and the
employee owe to each other, and the duty that both clas-
es owe to the public. From the earliest times to the
present day numerous questions have arisen as to
how the law relating to the two classes should be laid
down ; and numerous questions have been settled both by
statues and by the decisions of the court ; but still
many and vital questions are coming up to-day that
affect not only the interests of the great capitalists,
the freedom, wellfare and independence of the laborer ;
but also the very existance of the well organized forms
2of government under which both capital and labor derive
their power to act and to do business. Not many years
ago each laborer had the prospect of becoming the employer
of the future, and therefore this was rarely heard of.
In those days a man could start on a small scale and
increase his business slowly from year to year till he
in his turn became the employer in the future ; but now
all must admit that this is becoming more difficult as
the age of science advances and to-day you have two
distinct classes. One rich and powerful and the other
weak and dependent ; but either class could not exist
without the other, and to a certain extent they are
friends for it is the aim and object of each class to
produce wealth. In sharing it, however, their interests
are antagonistic to each other then here we find all the
Both classes have their organiza-
tions. The capitalists have organized together that
they may by concentrating their capital secure a larger
profit and use their powerful influence to secure their
own ambitious designs; while on the other hand labor has
organized that they may resist any oppression capital
would force on them, and to secure fair remunerations
for their services. Numerous questions come up as to
how far either class can legally and justly go to accom-
plish their aims and ambitions and secure the benefits
which would result in case of success. It is not my
aim or object to treat of the general subject in all its
phases for that would require not only a master mind,
and one capable of judging the two classes impartially;
The question to which I shall
causes of trouble.
but also years of labor.
4devote my labor is one that is both common and practical
and one on which there is a wide diversity of opinion.
Certain large corporations require their employees
before entering into their employment to sign a contract
releasing the employer from all liability in case the
employee is injured through the negligence of the employ-
er. Varying with the natu'e of the business the con-
tracts are drawn to cover each case,bUt adopting one that will
cover any case, and one that will contain all the mater-
ial elements that are required in such kinds of con-
tract I shall treat the question contained in it alone,
and my conclusion will apply with equal force to any
contract of this nature. In a recent case the follow-
ing contract which is the subject of my Thesis came up
for consideration. " For and in consideration of em-
ployment to be furnished me by the --- Co., and on the
6sum of one dollar to me in hand paid by said Co., I
hereby agree that in no case shall the said Co. be lia-
ble to me for any damage or injury to my person or prop-
erty by means of the negligence of the said Co., its
agents, servant or employee." Contracts of this partic-
ular kind seldom come before the court but decisions
have been rendered in nearly all the state and federal
courts of this country, and from these we may draw our
conclusions as to how this contract would be considered
when it comes up ; and also we may turn to the decisions
of courts of foreign countries and to statutes passed on
the subject ; for ststutes represent the expression of
the will of the people, and by such will the law should
be laid down. This contract contains the element of
consideration therefore this point will not be consider-
ed ; but for other good reasons I shall show that such a
contract is contrary to good morals and should be declar-_
ed void and set aside on the broad ground of public poli-
c.'. At the outset let us meet one reason given by those
who would uphol.d contracts of this kind and this is their
favorite argument "That men must be permitted to make
their own agreementsant that it is no concern of the pub
lic on what terms an individUal chooses to contract ;
whether he assumes great risks either to his person or
property. That any contract made by a competent party
upon valuable considerations, when made freely and intel-
ligently is valid." To say the parties have not a
right to make their own contracts, and to limit the pre-
cise extent of their own respective risks and liability,
in a manner in no way affecting the public morals or
conflicting with the public interest, would, in my
judgment be an unwarrantable restriction upon trade and
commerce and a most palpable invasion of personal right.
Let us understand what is meant by public policy and we
find that it is that principle of the law which holds
that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency
to be injurious to the public or against the public good,
which may be termed the policy of the law, or a public
policy in relation to the administration of the law.
It is true that the public interest is not affected
by individual contracts of the kind referred to ? Is
not the whole business community affected by holding such
contracts valid ? If held valid the advantageous posi-
tion of the employer in the exercise of his business is
such that it places it in their power to change the law
regulating the relief afforded in cases of negligence by
introducing new rules of obligation. The employer and
his employee do not stand on a footing of equality.
The employee must have employment to support his family,
and in the large majority of cases, he must follow the
manner of work or kind of employment that he has learn-
ed and is competent to do ; for they have not the means
to support their families while they journey from place
to place seeking a new employer or learning a new kind of
business, to say nothing about the anguish and hardship
of being compelled to leave their old homes with all its
pleasant memories, to leave their families dependent and
suffering while they journey to a strange land seeking
the means whereby they may earn their livelihood.
Every employee knows that his position may easily be
filled by others equally competent to take his place.
He knows that he is only one out of a million that must
have employment and he cannot afford to higgle as to the
terms of the contract or seek redress in the courts.
His means will not admit such a course. He prefers
rather to accept any terms and conditions that his em-
ployer may force on him and often, indeed, without know-
ing what those terms or conditions mean. I say in most
cases he has no alternative but to do this or endure
the hardships and chances of getting other employment.
For example, say the employer pays $50.00 per month to
those that sign such contracts and only $20.00 per
month to those that do not. Of course no man can live
and support a family on the latter sum and he would
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rather take the risk and abide the consequences than
accept it and thus would, in case he was injured, become
a burden upon the public, or in case of his death, leave
his family without redress for the injury they had sus-
tained through the fault and negligence of another, and
without means of support whereby they are either thrown
upon the charity of their friends or bounty of the pub-
lic. This fact is adverted to for the purpose of illus-
trating how completely in the power of the employer the
employees are ; and how necessary it is to stand firmly
by those principles of law by which the public interests
are protected. This dependence of the employee is most
clearly shown when we look at the great railway corpora-
tions of the land, who employ their men by thousands and
by reading the history of the unsuccessful attempts of
such men to secure their rights by means of strikes, and
also how the interests of the public are affected if
such contracts were allowed to stand. The strength of
every contract lies in the power of the promisee to ap-
peal to the courts of public justice for redress for its
violation. The administration of justice is maintained
at the public expense. The courts should never, there-
fore, recognize any transaction which, in its object, op-
eration or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to
the public welfare. Judge Wilmot, in 5 Denio, 434,
says "It is the duty of all courts of justice to keep
their eyes steadily upon the interests of the public even
in the administration of commutative justice ; and when
they find an action is founded upon a claim injurious
to the public, and which has a bad tendency to give no
countenence or assistance in foro civili.
contracts and agreements when contrary to public policy
when properly understood and applied, is one of the great pre
servatives of the state. S
stone of the social edifice.
ound morality is the corner
Whatever disturbs that,
is condemned under the fundamental rule". Therefore
we may take it as well settled that, in the law of con-
tracts, the first purpose of the courts is to look to
the welfare of the public ; and if the enforcement of
the agreement would be inimical to its interests, no re-
lief could be granted to the party injured, and even
though it might result beneficially to the party who
made and violated the agreement. Let us consider some
of the duties that the employer owes to his employees.
The law says that he shall select and employ careful and
The rule that
competent employees, furnish safe tools, machinery and
appliances, make and enforce suitable rules and regula-
tions and provide a safe and suitable place for his em-
ployees to labor. Now, what will be the effect if he is
allowed to make contracts releasing himself from liabil-
ity in case he is negligent in these duties and fails
to perform what the law requires him to do. We must
arrive at the inevitable conclusion that if he is allowed
to be relieved from these duties and from all liability
in case of his negligance that he will be more careless
as to furnishing safe tools, machinery, etc., and thereby
causing the lives and safety of his employees to placed
in positions of greater danger, and in the case of pub-
lic carriers of passengers the danger to the travelling
In support of these proposi-public would be increased.
tions, I will refer to what has been said on the subject
by courts of high standing whose reason seems to me to
be not only just and equitable, but practical and in ac-
cordance with good morality. In 20 Ohio, 434, the
Court says "It is a matter of universal observation
that in any extensive business where many persons are
employed, the care and prudence of the employer is the
surest guaranty against mismanagement of any kind. The
employer would, we think, be much more likely to be care-
less of the persons of those in his employ when he would
understand that he was not pecuniarily liable." In 44
Ohio St., 471, in Railroad Co. v. Spangler, the Court
held : "That the liabilities of Railroad Companies for
injuries caused to their servants by the carelessness
of other employees who are placed in authority and con-
trol over them, is founded upon considerations of public
policy and it is not competent for a Railroad Company to
stipulate with its employees at the time and as part of
their contract of employment that such liabilities shall
not attach to it." The Court continuing, says :
"If pecuniary liability for negligence promotes care in
providing safe machinery and the like, the same liability
will promote care in providing safe rules, appliances,
rerulations and all possible diligence in protecting its
employees from harm. In 31 Maine, 228, the Court says
in regard to common carriers making such contracts, "The
very great danger to be anticipated by permitting them
to enter into contracts to be exempt from losses occa-
sioned by misconduct or negligence can scarcely be over-
It would remove the principle safeguardest imat ed.
for the preservation of life and property in such con-
veyances. In 17 Wall. 357, the Court held that a corn-
mon carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from
responsibility when such exemption is not just and rea-
sonable in the eye of the law. That it is not just and
reasonable in the eye of the law for a common carrier to
stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the neg-
ligence of himself or his servants. In 8 Fed. Rep., 782,
that able and eminent man, Judge Gresham, in a case where
by a contract of this kind came up, said "When the de-
fendant's negligence in supplying his employees with
unsafe machinery has caused the death of the latter, the
law will not allow the defendant to say 'as in effect he
does say in his answer' it is true that my machinery was
defective and unsafe and my negligence caused the death
of my employee, but I am not liable to those who have
suffered from the loss of his lfe because I had a con-
tract with my employee which secured to me the right to
supply him with defective and unsafe machinery and to be
negligent.
policy.
Such a contract is void as against public
If there was no negligence the defendant need-
ed no contract to exempt him from liability, if he was
negligent, the contract set out in his answer will be of
no avail. Such is also the holding of Judge Roger A.
Pryor, in the case of Runt v. Herring, 49 N. Y. S., 126.
In 50 Fed. Rep., 561, Monroe v. The Iowa, the Court held,
"It is the settled law of the federal courts that an
express stipulation exempting a common carrier, whether
foreign or domestic from liability for losses caused by
the negligence of himself or his servants is contrary
to public policy and void."
a case where a person was injured by the negligence of
the Railroad Company while riding on a free pass con-
taining a stipulation releasing the company from all li-
ability in case the plaintiff was injured, the Court, in
a very able opinion decided that such contracts ought to
be held void, and their reason aptly applies to a con-
tract of this nature. The Court said : "There are two
distinct considerations upon which the stringent rule as
to the duty and liability of carriers rest. One is a
regard for the safety of the passenger on his own ac -
count, and the other is a regard for his safety as a
citizen of the State. The latter is a consideration of
public policy growing out of the interest which the State
or Government as parens patriae has in protecting the
lives and limbs of its subjects.
In Jacobus v. Railroad Co.,,
So far as the consid-
eration of public policy is concerned, it cannot be over-
ridden by any stipulation of the parties to the contract
of passenger carriage since it is paramount from its very
nature. No stipulation of the parties in disregard of
it or involving its sacrifice in any degree can then be
permitted to stand. Whether the contract is one based
upon consideration or not, the interest of the State in
the safety of the citizen is obviously the same. The
more stringent the rule as to the duty and liability
of the R.R. Co. and the more rigidly it is enforced, the
greater will be the care exercised and the more approxi-
mately perfect the safety of the passenger. Any relaxa-
tion of the rule as to the duty or liability naturally,
and it may be said inevitably, tends to bring about a
corresponding relaxation o" care and diligence upon the
It is true that the greater thepart of the carrier.
sense of responsibility, the greater the care and that
any relaxation of responsibility is dangerous. It is
the enforcement of the rule and of the liability imposed
thereby the mulcting of the carrier for his negligence
which brings home to him in the most practical, forci-
ble and effectual way, the necessity for strictly ful-
filling his obligations."
Judge Davis in Stinson v. the New York Central
R. R. Co., 32 'T. Y., 337, speaking of the New York de-
cisions which allowed common carriers to exempt them-
selves from liability for their own negligent acts, said:
"The fruits of this rule are already being gathered in
increasing accidents through the decreasing care and
vigilance on the part of these corporations and they will
continue to be reaped until a just sense of public pol-
icy shall lead to legislative restriction upon the power
to make this kind of contracts." And this language
was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Railway Co., v. Lockwood.
Greenhood on Public Policy, rule 445, says :A con-
tract whereby an employee relieves his employer from
responsibility for the latter's negligence, or that of
his other employees when he is responsible for their
negligence is void." It has been urged by some courts
that if the employer was held liable for negligence, that
this would cause the employee to be more careless of his
person and property, but says the court, in Railroad Co.
v. Ross, 112 U. S., 383 : "We have never known parties
more willing to subject themselves to dangers of life or
limb because if losing the one or suffering in the other,
damages could be recovered by their representatives or them-
selves for the loss of injury. The dread of personal
injury has always proved sufficient to bring into exer-
cise the vigilance and activity of the servant*. The
theory that public policy requires that servants should
have no remedy against their masters in such cases be-
cause the absence of any remedy will make them more care-
ful of their own safety then they would otherwise be
reminds me of nothing so much as the opinion of Chief
Justice Ruffin in the days of slavery that the law de-
nied any remedy for any amount of fortune to a slave
short of immediate murder out of humane regard to the
best interests of the slaves themselves. Also the idea
that a servant will expose himself to injury for the sake
of getting damages is overcome by the law of contributory
Now let us see if such contracts do not
effect the public."The safety of the people should be
the supreme law" says Montescuieu in his treatise on the
law of nations. The state as parens patriae has a duty
to perform in protecting the lives of its citizens. The
life of one man says an eminent senator in the legisla-
ture of the United States is worth many railroads. In
my opinion contracts of this nature ought to be held
void on this ground alone, and that no court of law or
justice ought to enforce them. The correct principal is
in my judgment that the state is interested in preser-
ving the lives of its citizens and hence will not permit
a railroad company or any other person or corporation to
stipulate against civil responsibility for homicides
committed through its own negligence.
negligence.
This bill. still
becomes more clear and strikes the mind with much force
when it is considered that the state punishes such neg-
ligent homicides as felonies. I doubt whether any part
of such a contract which stipulates against liability
for the consequence of the negligence of such corpora-
tions or persons ought to be sustained. If o nsidera-
tions of public policy will supervene to prevent a common
carrier from stipulating against the consequences of his
own negligence in respect to the care of inanimate mer-
chandise, may not such considerations be much more strong
ly urged where a master endeavors by contract to stipu-
late against responsibility for the killing or injuring
of a servant ? In those exceptional cases where a re-
covery is permitted a-ainst a master by a servant for an
injury caused by a fellow servant, it is upon the theory
that the master as well as the servant has been nerli-
gent-- that is, that the master has been negligent in
selecting an unskilled servant. So far, therefore,
as the above contract seeks to change any existing rule
of law, it seems clear that it is against public polic'
and void. The idea that a state will permit one of its
citizens for an increase of wages to contract away his
life or personal safety by a stipulation with another
citizen, which in effect says "If you injure me or kill
me through your negligence, neither I in the one case,
nor my personal representatives in the other will hold
you responsible, is monstrous". Besides to sustain such
contract as valid cannot fail to have a tendency to di-
minish the care exercised by the employer in the selec-
tion of his servants, nor can it fail to increase the
number of reckless and irresponsible servants in his em-
ploy, and in both of the ways the danger to the public is
increased. Conceding that special contracts,made by
the employer with his employee, limiting their liability,
are good and valid so far as they are just and reasona-
ble to the extent, for example of excusing them for all
losses happening by accident without any negligence or
fraud on their part, when they are asked to go still
further, and to be excused for negligence, an excuse
so repugnant to the law of good morals and the public
good, they have no longer any plea of justice or reason
to support such a stipulation, but the contrary ; and
such a rule would never have been entertained by the
sages of the law. In the last four years, there has
been 9,153 men killed and 88,712 injured in the employ-
ment of the railway companies alone.
rible loss of life and injury to person justly and
rightfully appeal to the coiirts to take every step that
will induce the employer to use all possible means to
ensure the safety of his employees ? It is the opinion
of those who favor the rich and powerful that the courts
ought to hold such contracts valid, and then if the rule
of law prove too great a hardship to the laborer, that
he should seek his remedy in the legislature by means of
statutes. This argument, in my opinion, has no sense
of reason or justice to support it. The law, as it is
now, providing no contract of this kind is made, gives
the laborer a remedy in case he is injured through the
fault or negligence of his employer, and if the courts
would allow the employer to take advantage of the situ-
Does not this ter-
tion of his employees and enforce sucli contract, then
the laborer is without a remedy till he is able to over-
come the powerful influence of thte rich and secure the
passage of necessary laws to protect himself. They
would allow the powerful to take advantage of the weak
and change the already existing rules of law that give
the laborer the little protection and benefit he now
has. The courts are not organized for the benefit of
the rich. They are sustained br the public and it is
their paramount duty to decide each case according as
justice and a high sense of morality shall dictate, and
above all, they should consider the public welfare and
the duty the governing power owes to its subjects. If
contracts were allowed to stand, then the old Latin maxim
(UBI JUS IBI REMEDIUM) should be wiped from our law
books and considered a relic of barbaric days.
hood on Public Policy says : "If any contract bind the
maker to do something opposed to the public policy of
the State or Nation or conflicts with the wants, inter-
ests or prevailing sentiment of the people, or our obli-
rations to the world, or is repugnant to th- morals of
the time, it is void, howevet' solemnly the same may be
made." I think I have conclusively shown that such a
contract is against the policy of a well regulated form
of government, that it is against good morals, and con-
flicts with the wants and interests of the mass of the
people. Now, let us see what the prevailing sentiment
of the people is. To this we will look at the statutes
of our different states, and also the laws of foreign
In Prussia, up to June 7th, 1881, the law
Green-
countries.
as it stood recognized the doctrine of the non-liability
of the employer, but says an eminent writer, "These rules
are not sufficient to meet the exigencies of modern
life, especially in the case of such great industrial
undertakings as railways, shipping, carriers, factories,
mines, etc., for says he, the profit gained and the risk
incurred by the employer would be out of all proportion
to each other, and almost the whole risk would be trans-
ferred to the public and the workmen." For this reason
the German Commercial Code has in the case of carriage
by land and by water, and especially in the case of rail-
ways, introduced a general liability on the carrier from
which vis major is the only exception, and has gone so
far as to prohibit contracts in derogation of this lia-
In France by the civil codeArt. 1384, thebility.
law is laid down as follows : "A person is liable not
only for the damage which he occasions by his own act,
but also for that which is caused by the acts of persons
for whom he must answer, or for the things which he has
in his keeping", and this rule of law is strictly en-
forced. The Italian follows the French Code.
In England the courts adopted the abnormal rule of
law allowing common carriers and employers to exempt
themselves from liability in case of their gross negli-
gence, misconduct or fraud ; but statutes were soon pass-
ed because the companies took advantage of those decis-
ions to evade altogether the salutary policy of the com-
mon law and the laborer was given a remedy. But in con-
struing the statutes, some of the lower courts have fol-
lowed the law as previously laid down and allowed em-
ployers to contract against the spirit and intent of
the law. These statutes show the sentiment of the peo-
ple there in regard to contracts of this kind, and, as
the higher courts have yet to pass on the question, it
cannot be said that those cases must be considered as
conclusive law on this question. In nearly all states
of ttiis country numerous statutes have been passed to
protect the safety of the laborer. Acts regulating the
working and operation of mines, factories, railroads,
etc. All jurisdictions give a party who is injured
through the fault of another adequate remedy. These
statutes are passed in the interest of the public, and
says the court in 29 Kansas, 169, "It is a familiar prin-
ciple of law that a contract made in violation of law
or the statutes, is void, and also that agreements
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contrary to the policy of statutes are equally void."
Surely contracts of this nature are clearly against the
intent of the law for it has always been the policy of
the law to grant relief to the injured party. Thi s
point is sustained by numerous authorities and is the
case whether the law is statute or common. It is
another well settled rule of law that employers cannot
shift the liability which the law has imposed upon them,
so as to make their agents liable and be themselves re-
lieved from all responsibility. Let us turn for a mo-
ment to some of the courts that hold such contracts val-
id. In 50 Ga., 465, Railroad Co., v. Bishop was a
case where the employee was working for the corporation
for the munificent sum of $1.25 per day. The company
on condition of allowing him the privilege of earning
his livelihood, reduced his wages to $1.00 per day and
made him sign a contract such as is mentioned above, and
the court upheld it on the ground that every person
ought to be allowed to contract freely. The very facts
of the case lead any one to see the injustice of the de-
cision ; but it has been followed by later decisions in
that State. Thompson says, in Thompson on Negligence,
page 1025, Vol. II, "These decisions do not do credit
to the jurisprudence of that State. They ignore the
unequal situation of the laborer and his employer.
They depart from the analogy of the rule of law which de-
nies to carriers the right to enter into contracts with
those whom they serve, stipulating against liability for
their own gross negligence and in so doing they place the
life of a man upon a lower footing than the proprietary
interests which a man may have in a chattel.
fith v. Dudley, 9 Q. B. D., 357, the Court held the same
as the Georgia cases, and Justice Field said : "That
workmen as a rule were perfectly competent to make rea-
sonable bargains for themselves", but says an eminent
author, "If this be so, it does not appear why any stat-
ute was needed", referring to the statute allowing the
servant to recover in case he was injured through the
fault of the master. I think the reasoning advanced by
these courts and these are the leading cases that up-
hold such contractsis clearly against good morals and
against the sentiment of the mass of the paople.
Whether a contract shall be avoided on the ground of
public policy does not depend upon the question whether
it is beneficial or otherwise to the contracting parties.
In Grif -
Their personal interests have nothing to do with it, but
the interests of the public are alone to be considered.
the State is interested not only in the welfare, but in
the safety of its citizens. To promote these ends is
the leading object of government. Parties are left to
make whatever contracts they please provided no legal or
moral obligation is thereby violated, or any public in-
terest impaired, but when the effect or tendency of the
contract is to impair such interest it is contrary to
public policy and void. Contracts in restraint of
trade are void because they interfere with the welfare
and convenience of the State, yet the State has a deeper
interest in protecting the lives of its citizens. The
uniform policy of the law has been to protect the safety
of the citizen who has to have recourse to any dangerous
mode of employment to gain a livelihood and to hold the
employer to the exercise of the utmost foresight even
as to possible dangers and the utmost prudence in guard-
ing against them. This polic- is dictated both by a
desire to protect the citizen and because the public
is interested in his safety. For example, let us con-
sider what would be the effect to allow the employer to
contract out of the spirit of the laws passed to protect
the interests of the many thousands that labor in the
mines. Just think of it ; the laws made for the proper
ventilation of mines, being neglected by the corpora-
tions, explosions dealing death and injury to the men
occur, and hundreds of families are thrown upon the pub-
lic with no means of support and thereby become a pub-
lic expense, and then, would you say that the courts
ought to sustain such contracts and allow the company
to hold them as a bar to suits for damages and that it
is no concern of the public ? Surely any one with a
true sense of justice would look with horror upon the
thought. Puffendorf says : "The first rise of servi-
tude is owing to the voluntary consent of the poorer and
more helpless persons and is founded upon the common
form of contract." Thus showing that the greatest of
obstacles in the way of civilization and liberty is bas-
ed upon the right to contract freely. Therefore all
contracts must be construed by looking at the interests
of the public first. Numerous classes of contracts are
declared void by the courts on the ground of public policy
and it is not necessary for the party to seek relief by
the aid of statutes.
The courts have in numerous cases changed the set-
tled rules of law when the true interest of the public
dictates that they should, therefore there is no reason
in the argument that it is always the duty of the legis-
lature to make the needed reforms. If this had been so
we should never have heard of the just rules that the
Equity Courts have promulgated. When the laws deny to
the laborer their just rights, then comes trouble and
strife and with that hardship and suffering. But when
laws protect those rights, and the laborer gets a fair
share of the profits he helps to earn, then we will hear
no more of strikes and bloodshed that cost the public
millions of money and interrupt the progress of civili-
zat ion. In every strike we read of wrongs committed
by the strikers or those in sympathy with them, but this
is one way they show their sense of the injustice done
them and they should not be blamed too much, but it is
the laws that should be judged harshly, for a law that
does not recognize the true interest of the workingmen
drives them to disobey it and using the words of Senator
Vorhees who says, "When the strong arm of the law in-
terposes between the laboring man and the laboring woman
and their last chance for bread by honest toil, their
sins for self-preservation are less odious to their Mercf
ciful Father than the prayers of the oppressors who have
driven them to ruin." Therefore, for the reasons above
set forth, and for the injustice that would ensue, and
in the interest of good government, I am strongly of the
opinion that such contracts should be held void.
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